Broadly, the steps are the application of international pressure particularly on Ethiopia to persuade it to accept and implement the Boundary Commission decision; co-operation with the UN mission and mutual withdrawal of forces from dangerous positions in and near the Temporary Security Zone; and international initiatives to encourage the sides to cease support of the other’s enemies, normalise relations and enter into dialogue on mutually beneficial economic co-operation such as sharing the benefits of ports like Assab.

These actions all remain relevant but neither the parties themselves nor the international community are likely to assemble the political will to take them quickly.

Eritrea may not need handouts, but the idea of linking its name with terrorism is offensive to its leaders. Eritrea has co-operated closely with the Bush administration against Al Qaeda and has faced its own Islamic insurgency.

Since coming to power, Eritrea has supported Sudanese opposition groups opposed to the Islamist government in Khartoum, primarily out of an ideological conviction that the fundamentalist regime threaten its interests.

But, it has still gone ahead to forge ties with groups that have close connections to Islamist extremists, in order to pursue their struggle against Ethiopia.

US relations with Addis Ababa are on a much firmer footing, despite occasional differences. Washington maintains that it did its best to discourage the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in late 2006.

Once the invasion took place, however, American intelligence, military targeting and logistical support was provided to Ethiopia, and US forces conducted at least two direct strikes of their own against Somali insurgents — the first in January, the second in June 2007.

The US is now directly involved in assisting Ethiopian anti-insurgency campaigns in Somalia. This has reduced the possibility of playing the mediation role it has assumed between Ethiopia and Eritrea at least since the outbreak of the 1998-2000 war.

However, what is needed at this point, is an immediate private but unmistakable message to Addis Ababa that Washington will have no sympathy for a stage-managed coup against the Eritrean regime or any military action to resolve the border stalemate unilaterally.

The UN role in resolving the conflict has been gradually eroded, both by the actions of the parties and those to be taken under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter by the UN Security Council.

This guarantee has never been invoked. Chapter VII, which is designed to deal with threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression, includes measures up to and including the use of force. It is unclear how or whether, the UN ever thought this might need to be used in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

By giving the guarantee and then allowing it to be flouted by both countries, however, the credibility of the Security Council has been diminished in a manner that hampers it in this and other crises.

All the same, the Council needs to support publicly the confidential US initiative proposed above through adoption of a resolution that contains elements designed to give the parties — particularly Ethiopia — support for the Boundary Commission decision; a request to the commission that it continue to hold itself available to complete its task by demarcating the border; and a statement that even without such demarcation the border as found by the commission is acknowledged as the legal boundary between the two countries and will be so regarded by the Council in its consideration of an appropriate response in the event that it is not respected by either party.

The effect of the above should be to prevent war in the next few weeks, but it will neither resolve the immediate crisis of the border nor bring a lasting peace.

To make progress on the former, the international community must devote more effort to reviving the Algiers peace agreement.

Results may not come fast or easy but the Security Council will be required to restate its unequivocal support for the agreement and all the measures that follow from it, including the work of the Boundary Commission and its less contentious sibling, the Claims Commission, and call on the parties to fulfil all their undertakings.

Their regional friends and those in the wider international community will need to help, including possibly by developing political initiatives aimed at addressing some security concerns in a regional context and economic initiatives that could provide mechanisms for mutually beneficial co-operation over, for example, the port of Assab.

While some of this can only come to fruition after the immediate border conflict has been resolved, policy planning and diplomatic discussion should begin at once since the perspectives might help the parties reach the conclusion that they have much more to gain by living up to the Algiers agreement than by maintaining the crisis.

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