The new strategy upheld by the democrat-dominated congress is designed notably to beef up sizably the embassies’ personnel, to increase US diplomatic representations in outlying areas, to provide them with more technological and communication means and to improve significantly the relations with the citizens of the host countries notably those who apply for entry-visas to the US.

The new proposed roadmap strongly recommends an end to the predominance of the military over the pure diplomatic action in all US embassies stressing that such a policy has all but further eroded the United States’ brand image across the world notably in Middle Eastern and African countries.

The recent opposition by most African countries including Algeria to the US-led AFRICOM force launched earlier this year is a telling case in point.

The proposed AFRICOM has triggered a general outcry in most parts of the African continent.

As a matter of fact, the Bush Administration announced the creation of the long-discussed U.S. Command for Africa (AFRICOM) on February 6, 2007.

For months before the announcement, policy makers and policy analysts in Africa had been divided over this new unified command, and the debate has not subsided.

Nonetheless, AFRICOM was formally established on October 1, 2007, with its temporary headquarters at Stuttgart, Germany, for an initial 12 months.

AFRICOM’s commander, General William E. Ward, the highest ranking African-American soldier, visited the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on November 8, 2007 in an attempt to obtain more African support for the command, but the AU remains bitterly divided over the desirability of the force.

It has also opened the way for critics to suggest that the American government’s good governance, development, and security rationales for a military command are a smokescreen intended to hide other and possibly nefarious objectives for AFRICOM.

The other part of theanswer as to why Africans have not embraced AFRICOM revolves around the perception that the architects of AFRICOM disparage or fail to recognize the advances Africa has made with respect to its own security through the African Union.

African analysts and policy makers believe that the Americans are taking the AU for granted and neglected consultation with AU officials before its announcement.

They claim that one of AFRICOM’s Achilles heels is that it has no plans to cooperate with the AU Peace and Security Council and that AFRICOM has the potential to undermine the Common Defense and Security Policy, which prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases on the continent.

However, since AFRICOM was constructed by planners who did not pay attention to the interests, mechanisms, and sensitivities of the AU, effective cooperation between the two is going to be difficult.

This reality underlines the point made by many of AFRICOM’s African critics: the main reasons for Africa’s generally negative reaction to AFRICOM lie in Washington, not in Africa.

AFRICOM will not be accepted in Africa if it does not take into account the desires and aspirations of the African people for peace, security, and development.

Story by: A. Boualkemh // Translated by: Med. B.

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