It was Somalia that attacked Ethiopia in 1977, triggering a series of Soviet moves that led to the end of détente between the superpowers and the rise of “Cold War II.” Détente, it was said, was buried in the sands of the Ogaden Desert.

Somalia was also the graveyard of the new world order. In December 1992, hoping to set a precedent for more robust principles of humanitarian interventionism, the United States chose Somalia as the site of a major peace operation to put a halt to its famine, warlordism, and anarchy. Instead of setting a precedent for humanitarian intervention and postcold war peace enforcement, events in Somalia nearly destroyed the credibility of UN peacekeeping and ruined the American appetite for international humanitarian operations and nation-building exercises. In the years that followed, the U.S. grew cautious about peace operations, cynical toward multilateralism and the UN, and indifferent toward failed states in the Third World. As for Somalia, our punishment for its impertinence was to pretend it didn’t exist.

But a decade later, the seemingly inconsequential country of Somalia appears destined yet again to play a major role in American foreign policy. This time, Somalia, which is near the top of the list of our next targets for military action, may become the litmus test for how we define and execute an expanded war on terrorism.

What could go wrong in Somalia? Plenty, particularly if we intervene without adequate knowledge of the country’s complex politics. One of the costs of ignoring Somalia since 1994 is that we are now caught trying to formulate policy about a country we know virtually nothing about. When information is bad, analysis and policy are likely to be flawed as well. American policymakers need a few important correctives that can prevent our policy on Somalia from descending into a repeat of the debacle of the early nineties.

First, Somalia’s Islamist movement, Al-Ittihad, is not synonymous with Al-Qaeda, and media insinuations to the contrary are wildly wrong. Al-Ittihad is a small, relatively weak organization, with a mainly domestic agenda. Some individual members have had links to Al-Qaeda that merit close scrutiny, but the group as a whole is in no way a subsidiary of Al-Qaeda.

Second, Somalia’s Transitional National Government (TNG) is not a front for al- Ittihad, and is not the Somali equivalent of the Taliban government. It is extremely weak, controlling only half of the city of Mogadishu, and while it has some Al-Ittihad members in its parliament, it is by no means a front for violent Islamists.

Third, Somalia does not currently harbor active terrorist bases and camps. Somalia’s Al-Ittihad movement abandoned the few towns and rural outposts it once controlled, and has since integrated into local communities as teachers, health workers, and businessmen. Bombing abandoned outposts would be a pointless exercise in rearranging rocks.

Finally, Somalia is not a likely safe haven for fleeing Al-Qaeda members. Concern about Somalia as a terrorist refuge is understandable. It is a collapsed state with no functional central government; global outlaws there could presumably escape the reach of law. In reality, however, Somalia is a lousy hideout for non-Somali radicals. Foreigners cannot operate in secrecy in Somalia; everyone knows who you are and what you’re doing, and locals would not hesitate to expose the presence of non-Somalis in their midst.

What does all this mean for an expanded war on terrorism in Somalia? It suggests that the only military action that might be appropriate in Somalia is a limited operation of capturing one or several major suspects. Chasing down minor players in the armed, clannish neighborhoods of Mogadishu would be dangerous and counterproductive.

Ideally, U.S. policy toward Somalia should be a combination of close monitoring, surveillance, and naval interdiction—which we are already doing—as well as constructive engagement with Somalia’s many local and regional authorities.

Somalis are above all else pragmatists, and if presented with the right combination of carrots and sticks—and if treated with respect—will work with us in the war on terrorism. Threatening military moves are not likely to achieve that goal. U.S. policy in Somalia will shed light on whether the war on terrorism is an essentially military campaign, or if we are clever and patient enough as a country to draw on the many tools in our toolbox besides the hammer.

CNN SATURDAY MORNING NEWS

Interview With Ken Menkhaus

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

CATHERINE CALLAWAY, CNN ANCHOR: After years of civil war and lawlessness, the U.S. now concerned that Somalia could be a haven for terrorist activity. So joining us from Charlotte, North Carolina to talk about Somalia and the war against terrorism is Ken Menkhaus. He's a political science professor at Davidson University, who has actually advised U.S. officials on the situation in Somalia. Thanks for being with us today.

KEN MENKHAUS, DAVIDSON UNIVERSITY: My pleasure.

CALLAWAY: First, let's start off about exactly what U.S. officials are going to be looking for in Somalia, obviously ties to, any connections to -- ties to the al Qaeda network. Are there any individuals known in Somalia to have connections?

MENKHAUS: Well, the U.S. is going to be looking for a wide range of possible issues in Somalia. That range is from fleeing al Qaeda members, who are seeking safe haven in Somalia, who are non-Somalis, to Somali individuals who may have associations or linkages with the organization.

At this time, there is no evidence to suggest that individuals or groups in Somalia are major players in al Qaeda. What we might be looking at are some mid-level players, some relatively small potatoes in the worldwide pantheon of Islamic radicalism.

CALLAWAY: It seems almost a slippery slope here, though, if you go into Somalia. Exactly what are the options for the U.S. and going into Somalia to look for those individuals?

MENKHAUS: None of the options are particularly attractive, and one of course would be the use of our own Special Forces to go in to snatch an individual. That should only occur is that individual poses a significant threat. If it's a minor player or someone that we're -- it's really not worth the risk, because it is a very high risk operation.

Alternatively, we could rely on a regional proxy, Ethiopia, which is very problematic diplomatically inside Somalia, or a local Somali proxy which also creates a lot of complications.

CALLAWAY: Yes, it is a dangerous situation there, as you mentioned. We certainly don't want a repeat of the "Black Hawk Down" situation that we've seen, a political, diplomatic nightmare if we start dropping bombs in Somalia, right?

MENKHAUS: And there's no reason to drops bombs in Somalia. One of the things that we do know with reasonable certainty at this time is that there are no terrorist camps or bases in Somalia that would present themselves as a target for bombing.

What we may have at most are individuals who are integrated into local society. They're not presenting themselves as terrorists or soldiers, and again that would present the snatching operation scenario.

CALLAWAY: And it would seen that those in Somalia would be more than happy to hand over for the right price, any individuals that the U.S. wanted.

MENKHAUS: Yes and no. If there are non-Somalis who were foolish enough to flee to Somalia seeking safe haven, they will be turned over very quickly. The Somalis would love to do that, both for the monetary rewards that they would expect and also the political recognition that would accrue to them.

If it's a Somali individual that we're looking for, that's more problematic because going after an individual in a clannish society tends to mean that you're taking on the clan as a whole, and we could expect people to pick up their guns and defend their own.

CALLAWAY: Is the media prematurely jumping on this issue of Somalia? What is likely that the U.S. will do?

MENKHAUS: The media may have picked up on cues from the U.S. Government and taken the story farther than it needed to go. There were -- about a month ago, the U.S. Government was making noises about Somalia, I think mainly driven by Ethiopian intelligence that might have been exaggerated.

The U.S. Government seems to have backed off a little bit. I think that what we're likely to see in Somalia is a continuation of what we're already doing, monitoring, aerial surveillance, and naval interdiction to make sure that vessels coming and going from Somalia aren't carrying terrorist suspects of material.

CALLAWAY: And we shall see. Ken Menkhaus, thank you very much for joining, being with us this morning.

MENKHAUS: Thank you.

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